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Abstract
This article aims at understanding the interplay between pension schemes
and tax instruments. The model features extensive labor supply in a
stationary environment with overlapping generations and perfect financial
markets.
Compared with the reference case of a pure taxation economy, we find
that taxes become more redistributive when the pension instrument is avail-
able, while pensions provide incentives to work.
1 Introduction
In the past ten years, following Prescott (2004)’s claim that the differences in
work habits in the US and in Europe were largely due to the differences in the tax
systems, a number or researchers have estimated labor supply elasticities both
at the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. It seems that an important,
perhaps previously neglected, element is the extensive margin and its reaction
to financial incentives at the beginning and at the end of the working life. This
has led to a number of models with endogenous retirement dates in a life cycle
setup, e.g. Prescott, Rogerson, and Wallenius (2009), Rogerson and Wallenius
(2009) and Ljunqvist and Sargent (2014). However there is still little work on
the interaction between nonlinear taxes and pension schemes. Indeed Diamond
(2009) states
Apart from some simulation studies, theoretical studies of optimal tax
design typically contain neither a mandatory pension system nor the
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behavioral dimensions that lie behind justifications commonly offered
for mandatory pensions. Conversely, optimizing models of pension
design typically do not include annual taxation of labor and capital
incomes. Recognizing the presence of two sets of policy institutions
raises the issue of whether normative analysis should be done sepa-
rately or as a single overarching optimization.
To make progress in this direction one has to choose among the many possible
formulations of the problem. Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) focus on the health
shocks associated with aging and the social insurance features of pension schemes.
Gorry and Oberfield (2012) and Michau (2014) introduce both an intensive and
an extensive margins, but keep the fixed cost of going to work constant over
the lifetime. Cremer, Lozachmeur, and Pestieau (2004), Lozachmeur (2006) and
Cremer, Lozachmeur, and Pestieau (2008) study a two period of life overlapping
generations model which allows them to discuss political economy aspects of the
problem. Also in an overlapping generations with two period lives and intensive
labor supply à la Mirrlees, Brett (2012) describes the comparative statics effects
of a change of the trend in population growth on the steady state.
Here we consider a deterministic overlapping generations model in continuous
time, where all agents have the same length of life. At each date labor supply is
extensive, either 0 or 1. There are a finite number of dynasties, that differ by their
(deterministic) profiles of productivity and pecuniary cost of going to work, as
well as by their instantaneous utility for consumption.1 The government wants to
redistribute lifetime welfare across dynasties. The policy instruments are an age
independent nonlinear tax schedule that depends on the current productivity of
the workers (the tax system cannot be based on the privately known cost of going
to work nor on the unobserved productivity of the non workers) and a pension
scheme, with the level of pension depending on various life-time statistics of the
worker activity.2
We start by studying the fiscal instrument in a setup without institutional
pensions. Optimality of the tax system can be characterized as a situation where
a redistributive force, holding labor supply constant, and an efficiency force,
changing labor supply and production, compensate. This generalizes Laroque
(2011). We are able to describe the shape of the optimal after tax income sched-
ule, which often is piecewise constant. We exhibit circumstances under which
1Our setup is similar in a number of respects with that used by Rogerson (2011), Shourideh
and Troshkin (2012) or Weinzierl (2011): overlapping generations, deterministic trajectories.
Here labor supply is extensive rather than intensive à la Mirrlees while saving and/or borrowing
are unrestricted.
2It should be noted that the framework of this paper is in the Ramsey tradition rather than
in the Mirrlees one. We put a priori restrictions on the shape of the government instruments,
and do not derive them from assumptions on asymmetric information, contrary to Diamond
and Mirrlees (1978), Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2010) or Golosov, Troshkin, and Tsyvinski
(2011).
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some agents have their labor supply distorted upwards.
Second, as regards pensions, we study simple schemes where pension transfers
depend on a single aggregate statistics of the work life: total time spent working
over the life cycle, before or after tax lifetime earnings. We relate distortions
to the pattern of the agents social weights. When society favors agents with
low skills or high costs of work (“redistributive economy”), the most skilled agent
has her labor supply undistorted and all other agents have their labor supply
distorted downwards.
Next we assess the extent to which taxation and pension regimes are comple-
mentary instruments for redistribution. We explain how the redistributive power
of a tax schedule is modified in the presence of a pension regime. The tax sched-
ule serves directly to redistribute income towards the socially favored agents, but
also indirectly to facilitate the redistribution operated through the pension trans-
fers. We show that by comparison with the case where there are no pensions, the
redistributitve force is larger: the tax instrument tends to specialize into redis-
tribution while pensions are used to provide the appropriate incentives to work.
Concentrating our attention on the period from middle age to the end of life, we
show that an optimal combination of a tax schedule with a pension policy elimi-
nates any rent coming from productivity differences across agents, suppresses all
upward labor supply distortions and reduces downward distortions. In the case
where there are only two types of agents, at the optimum the two instruments
fully specialize: pensions provide the incentives to work, while taxes do all the
redistribution.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Then
Section 3 deals with optimal taxation in the absence of pension policy, introducing
the efficiency and redistributive forces. Finally Section 4 analyses the interactions
between the tax and pension instruments.
2 Model
We consider an economy in continuous time. All agents have the same life length,
normalized to one. There are I types of agents. Agent of type i, if she works at
age a, produces at most wi(a) units of a single homogenous good but suffers a
pecuniary cost δi(a), measured in units of good. She has a lifetime utility function
of the form ∫ 1
0
ui[ci(a)] da,
where ui is an increasing concave function and ci(a) denotes consumption at
age a.
The type of an agent is thus characterized by a couple of exogenous, non-
negative functions (wi(·), δi(·)) defined on [0, 1] and by the instantaneous utility
index ui(·). The pair (wi(a), δi(a)) as the age a varies determines a curve in the
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(w, δ)-space, that we call a trajectory. We assume that the functions wi, δi, and
ui are differentiable.
At each date t, for each i = 1, . . . , I, the economy contains a continuum of
agents of type i of all ages a in [0, 1]; overtime the older agents die and are
replaced by newborn of the same type. All cohorts are of the same size, with one
agent of each type, and the economy is stationary. An allocation specifies the
nonnegative consumption ci(a) and the labor supply `i(a) in {0, 1} of all types i
along their lives.
Furthermore we assume that there are perfect markets for transferring wealth
across time, with a zero interest rate. The agents use these markets to smooth
their consumption overtime, ci(a) = ci independent of age. From now on we
restrict our attention to allocations where consumption is constant and equal to
its aggregate value over the lifetime ci.
Feasibility An allocation is feasible if and only if total consumption does not
exceed total output net of production cost:
I∑
i=1
ci ≤
I∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
[wi(a)− δi(a)]`i(a) da. (1)
An allocation is efficient whenever output net of production costs is maximized,
i.e. any agent works whenever her opportunity cost of work is lower than or equal
to her productivity, `i(a) = 1 if δi(a) < wi(a) and `i(a) = 0 if δi(a) > wi(a).
Utilitarian optimum (First-Best) The utilitarian optimum is the allocation
that maximizes
∑
i ui(ci) subject to the feasibility constraint (1). It is the feasible
efficient allocation such that marginal utilities are equal:
u′i(ci) = λ,
for i = 1, . . . , I.
Laissez-faire The agents maximize their lifetime consumption
ci =
∫ 1
0
max(0, wi(a)− δi(a)) da.
They decide to work whenever their productivity is larger than their opportunity
cost of work, so the laissez-faire equilibrium is efficient. In general, laissez-faire
yields an allocation that differs from the utilitarian optimum.3
3Suppose that δi(a) is a disutility cost instead of a pecuniary one, i.e. agent i, when working,
produces wi(a) and has instantaneous utility u(ci(a))−δi(a), while she has instantaneous utility
u(ci(a)) when not working. Then agent i works at age a under laissez-faire if and only if
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In all the paper we suppose that the utilitarian government observes the em-
ployment status of the agents and, when they work, their productivity w. It never
observes the pecuniary cost δ, which is private information. The government
has access to two policy instruments, an income tax and a retirement scheme.
The government instruments The first policy instrument is a time invariant
income tax schedule. The tax schedule is made of a function R(w), the age-
independent after-tax income of a worker with before tax wage w, and of a scalar s
equal to the subsistence income of the non-workers.
The second instrument is a pension scheme that relates a lifetime statistics Z,
to a (possibly negative) government transfer P (Z), which is equal to the present
value of all contributions and benefits associated with the retirement plan. In
practice, the pension transfer may depend on individual labor histories through
many different channels. We consider here three stripped down legislations bear-
ing on retirement, regimes L, W and N , with Z = L,W or N , where the agent
is entitled to get P (Z) provided that his life time performance is at least equal
to Z
• length of the agent working life, L,∫ 1
a=0
`i(a) da ≥ Li
• lifetime gross earnings collected by the agent, W ,∫ 1
0
wi(a)`i(a) da ≥ Wi
• lifetime after-tax (or net) earnings, N ,∫ 1
0
R(wi(a))`i(a) da ≥ Ni.
The three regimes that we analyze are far from exhausting the kinds of legislations
found in practice. Note in particular that we do not allow the tax schedule to
be age dependent, contrary to Weinzierl (2011), nor do we have the financial
market imperfections that underlie some of the pension regimes in practice. In a
previous version of the paper, we had studied a situation where the tax schedule
differed before and after the retirement age (in fact it was fully confiscatory after
the retirement age). Our pension regimes can be seen as a restricted way of
introducing age-dependent transfers.
u′i(ci)wi(a) > δi(a), where ci is her constant, instantaneous consumption level. Hence, this
specification entails an income effect in labor supply: participation decreases with ci. Using
Pareto-optimality conditions, it can be checked that laissez-faire is efficient. The pecuniary
model adopted in this paper avoids these complications.
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Second Best Program Facing the tax schedule (R(·), s) and a pension regime
associated with transfers P (·), the consumer chooses her labor supply `(a), and
pension level Z so as to maximize her lifetime utility, i.e.
ci = max
`,Z
s+
∫ 1
0
[R(w(a))− δi(a)− s]`(a) da+ P (Z)
where `(a) belongs to {0, 1}, and Z is linked to the agent work history depending
on the regime.
Feasibility then can be written in two equivalent ways, either as a balanced
government budget:
I∑
i=1
{∫ 1
0
[wi(a)−R(wi(a)) + s]`i(a) da− s− P (Zi)
}
≥ 0, (2)
or as the equality of aggregate production and aggregate consumption:
I∑
i=1
{∫ 1
0
[wi(a)− δi(a)]`i(a) da− ci
}
≥ 0. (3)
The second best program, maximizing the sum of utilities under the above
constraints, looks formidable. In the next section, we first study the optimal in-
come tax in the absence of retirement schemes, before considering the interaction
between taxes and pensions in the remainder of the paper.
3 Only income taxes
When an agent has productivity w at some date, her financial incentive to work is
equal to R(w)− s, which is to be compared with the opportunity cost of working
δ. It is useful to represent the financial incentive to work in the same plan as
the individual trajectories (w(a), δ(a)). Hereafter the incentive schedule is the
curve (w,R(w)− s) as productivity varies. An agent works in regions where her
trajectory is located below the incentive schedule, i.e. her opportunity cost of
work δ is smaller than the financial incentive to work R(w)− s. Her work status
changes at points where her trajectory crosses the incentive schedule.
3.1 General framework
Assuming that the agents can choose occupations requiring skills below their
own ability, no one would choose an occupation whose required productivity
belongs to a decreasing part of the function R, preferring to produce less and to
earn a higher after-tax income. Formally, we can replace any function R with
R˜(w) = maxw′≤w R(w′). It follows that, without loss of generality, we limit our
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attention to functions R that are nondecreasing and assume that workers work
at full productivity. Lifetime consumption of agent i is therefore given by
coi = s+
∫ 1
0
[R(wi(a))− δi(a)− s]`oi (a) da, (4)
with
`oi (a) = 11R(wi(a))−δi(a)−s≥0.
The superscript o, for ‘only tax’, indicates the absence of a pension scheme. For
notational simplicity, we do not mention the policy instruments R and s in the
arguments of the labor supply functions `oi . The Lagrangian of the problem in
the absence of a pension scheme reduces to
Lo =
I∑
i=1
ui(c
o
i ) + λ
I∑
i=1
[Yi(`
o
i )− coi ] ,
where λ is the multiplier of the government budget and Yi(`oi ) is agent i’s lifetime
net output:
Yi(`
o
i ) =
∫ 1
a=0
[wi(a)− δi(a)]`oi (a) da.
The problem is to find the tax instruments (R(·), s) which maximizes the La-
grangian Lo subject to the constraint that R(·) be nondecreasing. An equal
translation of R(·) and of the subsistence income s, which does not alter labor
supply, yields the first order necessary condition:
∑
i u
′
i(c
o
i ) = Iλ.
The Lagrangian depends on the tax schedule through two channels: consump-
tion levels ci and labor supplies `i. Hereafter, we label “redistribution force” and
“efficiency force” the effect of R through these respective channels. The first force
is present at all productivity levels while the second is active only at points w
where an agent is indifferent between working and not working. Formally we
compute the Frechet-derivatives of the Lagrangian of the government problem,
seen as a functional that maps the set of functions R into R. To this aim, we
evaluate the Lagrangian at a slightly perturbed function R + εh, compute the
ratio [Lo(R+ εh)−Lo(R)]/ε, and let ε tend to zero. A mathematical derivation
of the limit can be found in Appendix A. Here we present a heuristic approach
of the differentiation.
The redistribution force This force comes from the dependence of lifetime
consumptions on the after-tax schedule. Suppose we replace the after-tax income
R with R+ dR on the interval [w,w + dw], with dw > 0. This change in after-
tax income translates into a change in consumption for the agents who work at
productivity levels in [w,w + dw]. The change in agent i’s lifetime consumption
is given by
dcoi = dTi(w; `
o
i ) dR, (5)
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where Ti(w; `i) denotes the time spent by agent i with worktime profile `i working
in a productivity lower than or equal to w
Ti(w; `i) =
∫ 1
0
`i(a)1wi(a)≤w da, (6)
and, accordingly, its derivative dTi(w; `i) represents the time spent by agent i
working in a productivity between w and w + dw.
By construction, Ti(w; `i) is a nondecreasing function of w. The limit of
Ti(w; `i) as w goes to infinity is the total time agent i works over her life cycle,
hereafter denoted Li.
The derivative of Ti(w; `i) with respect to w, dTi(w; `i), is a positive measure
which is almost everywhere continuous, possibly having mass points at produc-
tivity levels where agent i spends non-infinitesimal periods of time. If we think of
agent i’s productivity when she works as a random variable, the probability mea-
sure dTi(w; `i)/Li can be thought of as the distribution of that random variable.
Suppose agent i’s trajectory crosses the incentive schedule from below at w0, i.e.
the agent works for w ≤ w0 and does not work for w ≥ w0 along the trajectory.
Then dTi has a downward discontinuity at w0, Ti has a concave kink at w0. If
the trajectory crosses the schedule from above, then the kink of Ti is convex.
By the chain rule, the variation of the Lagrangian coming from the changes
in lifetime consumptions is given by dLo = dΦo(w; `o), where Φo(w) is the social
marginal utility of income (net of the cost of public funds) for workers with
productivity below w:
Φo(w; `o) =
I∑
i=1
[u′i(c
o
i )− λ]Ti(w; `oi ). (7)
The term dΦo(w; `o) reflects the redistributive force. Redistribution induces the
government to raise (lower) after-tax income in regions where dΦo(w; `o) > 0
( dΦo(w; `o) < 0). The observation that λ is the average of marginal utilities
yields the following result.
Lemma 1. The net social marginal utility of income of workers with productivity
below w, Φo(w; `o), has the same sign as the correlation between marginal utilities
u′i(c
o
i ) and working times Ti(w; `oi ).
Labor supply elasticity A change in the tax schedule may also affect labor
supply. We say that there is indifference at w if there exists an agent i, having
productivity w at some age ai, w = wi(ai), who is indifferent between working and
not working at this age, i.e. R(w)− δi(ai) = s. A switch point is an indifference
point such that the work status of the indifferent agent changes in a neighborhood
of w, i.e. the trajectory of agent i crosses the incentive schedule at w. When the
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wδ,R− s
dR
| dw|
R′ dw
δ′ dw/w′ R(w)− s
R(w)−s+ dR
dR
Agent
trajectory
Figure 1: Labor supply elasticity. Original (perturbed) schedule: solid (dashed)
line.
slopes of the tax schedule and of the trajectory are different, R′(w) 6= δ′i/w′i, the
quantity
ηoi (w;R) =
1
|δ′i(ai)−R′(w)w′i(ai)|
(8)
is positive and finite.
Consider a switch point w and replace R with R+ dR on the interval [w,w+
dw], with dR = (δ′i/w′i − R′) dw, as shown on Figure 1. (In the represented
example, the trajectory is decreasing in the (w, δ)-space; specifically the agent’s
productivity and cost of work respectively decline and rise with age.) The per-
turbation changes the status of the agent on the interval from working to non
working. The time spent in the interval is
da = dw/|w′i| = ηoi dR,
hence ηoi is the derivative of labor supply with respect to the tax schedule R.
When R − s increases by one percent, the time agent i spends working at a
productivity below w is increased by εoi (w;R) percent, where εoi (w;R) denotes the
elasticity of agent i’s labor supply, Ti(w; `oi ), with respect to financial incentives
to work:
εoi (w;R) =
R(w)− s
Ti(w; `oi )
ηoi (w;R). (9)
The labor supply elasticity depends on both the gradient of the trajectory and
the slope of the after-tax schedule at the switch point. In particular, the steeper
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the tax schedule at w, the lower the elasticity, because the agent spends less time
in the region affected by the perturbation.
The above formula is readily adapted if agent i’s trajectory crosses the tax
schedule more than once. Formally, the Frechet-derivative of Ti(w; `oi ) with re-
spect to the tax schedule R is a positive measure made of mass points at agent i’s
switch points below w, see equation (43) in Appendix A.2. Similarly, the elasticity
of the aggregate labor supply, T (w; `o) =
∑I
i=1 Ti(w; `
o
i ), is given by
εo(w;R) =
R(w)− s
T (w; `o)
∑
i∈I(w)
ηoi (w;R), (10)
where I(w) is the set of agents who switch at w.
The efficiency force A marginal change of the incentives to work, d(R − s),
on a small interval around a switch point w of agent i has only a second-order
effect on her permanent income because she is indifferent between working and
not working at this point. Such a change, however, affects the net output she
produces over her life cycle:
dYi(`
o
i ) = [w − δ] ηoi (w;R) dR, (11)
where δ = R(w) − s is agent i’s cost of work at the switch point. At the same
time, the change affects the government revenue. For instance, if dR > 0 and
w > R − s, the variation of the tax schedule induces the agent to switch from
not working to working on a short period of her life, which raises the government
revenue. We define the efficiency force as
dΨo(w; `o) = λ
∑
i
dYi(`
o
i ).
We show formally in Appendix A that this force is a discrete measure concentrated
on the set of all switch points
Ψo(w; `o) = λ
∑
σ∈S
[wσ −R(wσ) + s] ηoi (wσ;R)11wσ≤w, (12)
where S is the set of all agents’ switch points, wσ is the productivity level at σ,
and εo(w;R) is the total labor supply elasticity given by (10). The previous
analysis is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the absence of a pension scheme, the Lagrangian Lo is differ-
entiable at any point (w,R(w)−s) where no trajectory is tangent to the incentive
schedule. Its derivative can be written as the sum
dLo = dΦo(w; `o) + dΨo(w; `o), (13)
where the almost everywhere continuous measure dΦo(w; `o) given by (7) and
the discrete measure dΨo(w; `o) given by (12) represent the redistribution and
efficiency forces.
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Raising R at an indifference point increases labor supply, which alleviates
the government budget constraint if w > R − s and makes it more stringent if
w < R − s. Hence, income maximizing pushes the government to raise (lower)
after-tax income in regions where w > R − s (w < R − s). This force translates
into mass points in the derivative of the Lagrangian or even into discontinuity
points in the Lagrangian function.
On the other hand, the redistributive force, expressed in the term (7), is
absolutely continuous (except at productivity levels where some workers spend a
finite time): the redistributive effect of an increase in the after-tax income on an
interval of productivities is the integral on the interval of the net social marginal
utility of income dΦo.
The above analysis allows to concentrate attention on a particular class of tax
schedules (see Appendix B for a formal proof).
Proposition 2. The second-best optimum may be achieved with an incentive
schedule that is piecewise either constant or coincident with an increasing trajec-
tory.
When the tax schedule coincides with an increasing trajectory, the govern-
ment faces a particularly strong efficiency force.4 Otherwise the monotonicity
constraint binds. Putting the signs of dΦo(w; lo) and dΨo(w; lo) on the diagram
of trajectories allows to qualitatively separate intervals of productivities where
the redistribution and efficiency forces tend to push R up from those where these
forces are downwards.
Since we expect bunching to be the norm, it is worthwhile to spell out the
form of first order conditions under bunching. Consider a bunching interval
[w0, w1]. We can raise or lower R on the whole bunching interval, raise it on
right subintervals [w,w1], and lower it on left subintervals [w0, w]. None of these
variations should increase the Lagrangian, which yields the first-order conditions:
dLo([w,w1]) ≤ 0, (14)
for all w in the interval, with equality for w = w0. This implies in particular that
dLo is nonnegative at w0 and non-positive at w1.
3.2 An example: two types and decreasing trajectories
To put in practice the previous analysis, we consider a simple environment with
two types of agents, a high type H and a low type L, endowed with the same
utility function u, with wH(a) > wL(a) and δH(a) < δL(a) for all a in [0, 1].
Economically we focus on the second parts of lives, limiting our attention to
decreasing trajectories generated by δ functions which are increasing with age,
4See the last paragraph of Appendix B.
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while the wage functions are decreasing with age. We also suppose that there is
a natural retirement age: the trajectories intersect the 45 degree line.
This set of assumptions is consistent with many different patterns. If the
agents’ productivities are very close while their opportunity costs of work are
very different, agent L’s trajectory is above agent H’s in the (w, δ) plan, see
Figure 3. In the opposite case, agent H trajectory lies at the right of that of
agent L, see Figure 4. The trajectories may very well cross, possibly many times,
meaning that the same characteristics (productivity, cost) are reached by the two
agents at different ages. Formally, the following properties hold.
Assumption 3.1 (Decreasing trajectories). The two agents have the same utility
functions u. Their productivities, wH(a) > wL(a), decrease with age and their
pecuniary costs of work, δH(a) < δL(a), increase with age. There exist ages a∗L
and a∗H in (0, 1) such that wL(a∗L) = δL(a∗L) and wH(a∗H) = δH(a∗H).
The fact that typeH dominates pointwise type L implies that its consumption
and welfare are at least as large, whatever the tax schedule, cH ≥ cL. Any non-
decreasing tax schedule crosses each trajectory only once, respectively at ages aH
and aL, aH ≥ aL, with associated wages wH(aH) and wL(aL) and opportunity
costs of work δH(aH) and δL(aL). The wages wH(aH) and wL(aL) represent the
lowest productivities at which the agents work. The following proposition pro-
vides the list of all possible configurations at the second-best optimum. Then
we present two examples that illustrate how unobserved heterogeneity affects the
labor supply distortions.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 3.1, the following properties hold:
(i) There exists an optimal tax schedule with at most two values;
(ii) Agent H has her labor supply distorted downwards;
(iii) Agent L labor supply can be distorted in any direction or undistorted;
(iv) Agent H retires later and enjoys higher lifetime consumption than agent L:
cH − cL =
∫ aL
0
[δL(a)− δH(a)] da+
∫ aH
aL
[R(wH(a))− s− δH(a)] da > 0.
(15)
Proof. The inequality aH > aL follows from the ordering and the monotonicity
of the functions R(wi(a))− s− δi(a), i = H,L. This inequality, in turn, implies
cH > cL and u′(cH) < u′(cL).
Consider any productivity threshold w greater than w¯ = max(wH(aH), wL(aL)).
Only the redistribution force is present above w and its integral over the set
[w,wH(0)],
(u′(cH)− λ)(TH(w; lo)− TH(wH(0); lo) + (u′(cL)− λ)(TL(w; lo)− TL(wL(0); lo),
12
δw0
R(w)− s
450
L
δH
δL
wL(aL)
H
wH(aH)
Figure 2: Agent H works at low productivities (case (a) of Proposition 3)
is strictly negative because u′(cH) < u′(cL) and agent H spends strictly more
time working in that region than agent L, w−1H (w) > w
−1
L (w). The function
r(w) = min(0, R(w¯) − R(w)) is non-increasing, and is an admissible variation
of the tax schedule as R + εr is nondecreasing for small values of ε. We must
therefore have:
< dLo, r > =
∫ wH(0)
w¯
r(w) dΦo(w; lo)
=
∫ wH(0)
w¯
r′(w) [Φo(wH(0); lo)− Φo(w; lo)] dw ≤ 0.
Since the bracketed term in the above inequality is negative and r′ ≤ 0, we get
r′ = 0 and thus R(w¯) = R(w). The after-tax schedule, therefore, is flat above
max(wH(aH), wL(aL)).
We now consider three cases in turn:
(a) Agent H is the only one working at low productivities, wH(aH) < wL(aL);
(b) Agent L is the only one working at low productivities, wL(aL) < wH(aH);
(c) Both agents work at low productivities, wH(aH) = wL(aL).
In case (a), only agent H works at productivities lying between wH(aH) and
wL(aL). Since u′(cL) > u′(cH), the redistribution force in that interval pushes
downwards, so the financial incentive to work R−s equals δH(aH) in that interval.
From the bunching conditions, it must be the case that the efficiency force is
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active and upwards at wH(aH), hence wH(aH) > δH(aH): agent H’s labor supply
is distorted downwards.
To examine agent L’s labor supply, we suppose first the tax schedule is contin-
uous at wL(aL), i.e. δL(aL) = δH(aH). In this case, the after-tax schedule takes
only one value for w ≥ wH(aH), namely the common value of δL(aL) = δH(aH),
and agent L’s labor supply is distorted downwards, because wL(aL) − δL(aL) is
larger than wH(aH)− δH(aH) > 0. We consider now the case where the schedule
is discontinuous at wL(aL). We know that R−s is flat and equal to δL(aL) above
that point. We can therefore consider a transformation that pushes R − s down
from δL(aL) to δH(aH) just above w(aL). The redistribution and efficiency effects
of the transformation respectively bear on type H and type L. The former is
positive and of the sign of (u′H − λ)(δL − δH) since it takes δL − δH from type H
while leaving L’s lifetime consumption level unaffected. The latter is of the sign
of −(w(aL) − δL). For them to sum up to zero, we must have w(aL) > δL(aL):
agent L’s labor supply, again, is distorted downwards.
The analysis of cases (b) and (c) proceeds in the same way and is relegated
to Appendix C. Collecting the results obtained in the three cases, we directly get
parts (i), (ii), and (iii) of the proposition. We have also seen that aH > aL and
can therefore compute
cH − cL =
∫ aH
0
[R(wH(a))− s− δH(a)] da−
∫ aL
0
[R(wL(a))− s− δL(a)] da.
In each of three cases studied above, the tax schedule is flat over [wL(aL), wH(0)],
and hence R(wL(a)) = R(wH(a)) for all a ≤ aL, which yields (15).
We will see in the next section how pension regimes manage to reduce the
difference cH − cL, thus helping to redistribute. Before turning to this central is-
sue, we illustrate the impact of the heterogeneity on labor supply distortions, see
point (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3. We use two examples where the agents differ
only in one dimension, either productivity or opportunity cost of work. These
examples, therefore, are at the limit of what is permitted by Assumption 3.1.
Again, we focus on the second part of the agents’ lives where productivity de-
creases and opportunity cost of work increases, as in the solid lines of the left
panels of Figures 3 and 4.
Example 1 (Same productivities, different opportunity costs of work). In addi-
tion to Assumption 3.1, suppose that the agents are equally productive, wH(a) =
wL(a) for all a, while agent H has a lower pecuniary cost of work: δH(a) < δL(a)
for all a. Then at the optimum, both agents have their labor supply distorted
downwards.
In Example 1, we must be in case (a) of the proof of Proposition 3. Moreover
the configuration with δL(aL) = δH(aL) is not possible here. Indeed, as the two
14
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w0
R(w)− s
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H
L
Figure 3: Two types, same productivities
agents would work exactly the same time at productivities above any threshold
w, an increase of the tax schedule above w(aL)− ε for a small ε > 0 would have
no redistributive effect and a positive efficiency effect at w(aL) –a contradiction.
The optimal schedule is therefore discontinuous at w(aL) as shown on the left
panel of Figure 5.
Example 2 (Different productivities, same opportunity costs of work). In addi-
tion to Assumption 3.1, suppose that the agents have the same pecuniary costs of
work, δH(a) = δL(a) for all a, while agent H is more productive: wL(a) < wH(a).
Then at the optimum, agent L has her labor supply distorted upwards.
w
δ
Age
A
wH(a)
wL(a)
δ(a)
0
δ
w0
R(w)− s
450
H
L
Figure 4: Two types, same opportunity costs of work
In Example 2, we must be in case (b) of the proof of Proposition 3. Moreover
the configuration where the tax schedule is flat is not possible here. Indeed, the
equality δL(aL) = δH(aL) would imply aL = aH , meaning that the two agents
15
δw0
R(w)− s
450
H
L
δ
w0
R(w)− s
450
H
L
Figure 5: The optima with same productivities (left), same opportunity costs of
work (right)
would have the same total working time: a uniform increase of R − s would
thus have no redistributive effect and a positive efficiency effect at wH(aH) –
a contradiction. The optimal schedule is therefore discontinuous at wL(aL) as
shown on the right panel of Figure 5.
In Example 1, the heterogeneity primarily comes from the opportunity cost
of work while in Example 2 it comes from the productivity. In both cases, the
government cannot implement the first-best in these two-type economies. The
direction of the distortions, however, is sensitive to the source of the heterogeneity.
4 Retirement schemes
To redistribute welfare across types, we now allow the government to use a re-
tirement scheme on top of income taxation. We shall limit ourselves to one of
the three retirement schemes Z in {L,N,W} presented page 5. The presence of
such a scheme makes the subsistence income s superfluous: increasing pension
transfers by s, P (Z) becoming P (Z) + s, and simultaneously increasing taxes
by s, R(w) becoming R(w) − s, leaves the second best program of page 6 un-
changed. Hereafter we set s = 0. Agent i lifetime consumption is the sum of
lifetime earnings and pension wealth
ci =
∫ 1
0
[R(wi(a))− δi(a)]`i(a) da+ P (Zi).
It is useful to introduce the optimal lifetime earnings, the function γi(Zi;R) which
is the maximum of ∫ 1
0
[R(wi(a))− δi(a)]`i(a) da (16)
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over `i(.), subject to the relevant pension constraint, namely
• under regime L: Li ≤
∫ 1
0
`i(a) da;
• under regime W : Wi ≤
∫ 1
0
wi(a)`i(a) da;
• under regime N : Ni ≤
∫ 1
0
R(wi(a))`i(a) da.
Agent i lifetime consumption is then
ci = γi(Zi;R) + P (Zi). (17)
To make sure that the level of pension Zi is chosen by agent i, it is standard
to replace the maximization with respect to Z with a set of incentive constraints.
Let (IC)i,j denote the constraint that agent i does not strictly prefer agent j’s
allocation
P (Zi)−P (Zj) ≥ γi(Zj;R)− γi(Zi;R)⇐⇒ ci ≥ cj − γj(Zj;R) + γi(Zj;R). (18)
Under a given pension regime, the government selects the retirement scheme
P (Z) and the tax schedule R(.) that maximize its utilitarian objective
max
∑
i
ui(ci) =
∑
i
ui(γi(Zi;R) + P (Zi))
subject to the feasibility constraint (2) or (3) and the family of incentive con-
straints (18).
Our aim is to understand how the retirement schemes interact with income
tax. We proceed as follows. In Section 4.1, we explain how the agents’ lifetime
consumption and labor supply depend on the tax schedule R and the pension
requirement Z. Section 4.2 exhibits conditions under which the single crossing
property holds and attention can thus be restricted to local incentive constraints.
In Section 4.3, we link the pattern of active binding incentive constraints to the
shape of social weights. In Section 4.4, we look for the optimal pension require-
ments Zi and derive a necessary condition on the agents’ labor supply at the
optimum. Section 4.5 presents necessary conditions for the optimal tax sched-
ule. Section 4.6 shows that the three considered pension schemes are equivalent
when the agent’s trajectories are decreasing and spell out how pensions allow
to improve upon the second best optimum of Section 3 where the only available
instrument is income tax.
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4.1 Properties of labor supply and consumption demand
The presence of a retirement scheme modifies the agents’ behaviors. For a pension
requirement Z, letting z(w) respectively equal to 1, w or R(w) in regimes L, W
and N , the constraint associated with the retirement scheme takes the form5∫ 1
0
z(w(a))`z(a) da ≥ Z. (19)
The behavioral impact of the retirement scheme goes through this constraint,
and the associated nonnegative Lagrange multiplier pi. Agent i’s labor supply
depends directly on the tax schedule R and indirectly, through the multiplier pii,
on the pension requirement Zi. More precisely, when making her labor supply
decision, agent i takes into consideration the adjusted tax schedule R(w)+piiz(w).
The first component R(w) represents the instantaneous after-tax income while
the second term piiz(w) represents the (deferred) pension benefit associated with
before-tax earning w. The multiplier pii can therefore be thought of as an implicit
conversion rate between after-tax earnings and pension benefits. Formally labor
supply is given by6
`zi (a) = 11R(wi(a))+piiz(wi(a))−δi(a)≥0. (20)
We analyse how it depends on the after-tax schedule and on the pension
requirements. A change of the after-tax schedule around a switch point affects
labor supply through two channels.
First, it affects the time spent working around the switch point in the same
way as in Section 3. To get the expression of this direct effect, we replace the
after-tax schedule R(w) in (8) with the adjusted schedule R(w) + piiz(w):
ηzi (w;R, pii) =
1
|δ′i −R′(w)w′i − piiz′(w)w′i|
, (21)
which yields the labor supply elasticity: εzi = ηziR/Ti. The static elasticity under
regime L is the same as in the absence of pension because the derivative z′ is
identically zero in that case. For decreasing trajectories, we have
ηzi (w;R, pii) ≥ ηoi (w;R)
because the adjusted after-tax schedule R(w)+piiz(w) is steeper than the original
schedule R(w) (recall the qualitative analysis below Figure 1).
Second, when the pension constraint (19) is binding, the change in the after-
tax schedule affects the multipliers pii. Increasing R around a switch point trans-
lates into a decrease of pii, i.e. less pressure placed by the pension scheme on
5We use the superscript z to differentiate the behavioral functions according to the regimes,
`, w or n.
6For notational simplicity, we do not mention R and Zi in the arguments of `zi .
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the agent’s labor supply. This feedback effect of the tax schedule on the pension
multipliers, in turn, affects labor supply in a nonlocal way through (20). By
“nonlocal”, we mean that a change of R around a particular switch point alters
labor supply around all switch points of agent i.
The following lemma describes the effect of the tax schedule R, but also of
the pension requirements Zi, on labor supply behavior.
Lemma 2 (Labor supply). If agent i switches work status at w, a marginal
increase dR of after-tax income R(w) on [w,w + dw]
• directly increases her labor supply around w by ηzi dR, where ηzi is given
by (21);
• indirectly decreases, if the pension constraint (19) is binding, the time spent
working in the neighborhood of any switch point w′
− η
z
i (w)η
z
i (w
′)z(w)z(w′)∑
σ∈Si z
2(wσ)ηzi (wσ)
dR, (22)
where Si is the set of all switch points of agent i.
When w is not a switch point of agent i and the pension constraint is binding,
the same perturbation has no effect on her labor supply in regimes L and W and
has a second-order, indirect effect on labor supply around all switch points w′
− η
z
i (w
′)R(w′)∑
σ∈Si R
2(wσ)ηzi (wσ)
dTi(w; `
z
i ) dR (23)
in regime N .
Finally, when the pension constraint is binding, a marginal increase dZi of the
pension requirement increases the time agent i spends working in the neighborhood
of all switch points w′ by
ηzi (w
′)z(w′)∑
σ∈Si z
2(wσ)ηzi (wσ)
dZ. (24)
Proof. In appendix D, we derive the expression for the feedback effect of the
after-tax schedule on the pension multipliers. Specifically, we show that when the
pension constraint (19) is binding, a marginal increase dR of after-tax income
R(w) around a switch point w decreases pii by
dpii = − z(w)ηi(w)∑
σ∈Si z
2(wσ)ηzi (wσ)
dR. (25)
Similarly, we show that a marginal increase dZ of the pension requirement Z
increases pii by
dpii =
1∑
σ∈Si z
2(wσ)ηzi (wσ)
dZ. (26)
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The nonlocal effects at any switch point wσ of agent i, (22) and (24), follow by
the chain rule.
Finally we also prove in the appendix that in regime N , if w is not a switch
point, a marginal increase dR of after-tax income R(w) around w decreases pii
by
dpii = − 1∑
σ∈Si R
2(wσ)ηzi (wσ)
dTi(w; `
z
i ) dR, (27)
which yields (23).
As regards the perturbation of the tax schedule at a switch point w (first part
of Lemma 2), it is worth noticing that, at the considered switch point w′ = w, the
direct effect ηzi (w;R, pii) dR weakly dominates the indirect effect given by (22).
That is, labor supply weakly increases around w following a local increase in R
( dR > 0), while it decreases around the other switch points. If there are no other
switch points than w and the agent labor supply is constrained by the pension
system (pii > 0), both effects cancel out exactly. This is because when w is the
only switch point on the agent trajectory, labor supply is entirely determined
by the pension requirement (19), so changing R around the switch point has no
effect on labor supply.
The properties of consumption, from (17), follow from those of the function
γi(Z;R):
γi(Z;R) = max
{∫ 1
0
[R(wi(a))− δi(a)] `zi (a) da+ pii
(∫ 1
0
z(wi(a))`
z
i (a) da− Z
)}
.
Lemma 3 (Consumption demand). Under regimes L, N and W , the functions
γi(Z;R), i = 1, . . . , I are non-increasing and concave in Z with their derivative
being given by
∂γi(Z;R)
∂Z
= −pii.
The Frechet-derivative of consumption with respect to the tax schedule is given by
∂γi(Z;R)
∂R(w)
= dTi(w; `
z
i ) (28)
under regimes L and W and by
∂γi(Z;R)
∂R(w)
= (1 + pii) dTi(w; `
z
i ) (29)
under regime N , where Ti(w; `zi ) is the time spent working below productivity w.
Proof. When Zi is lower than Z0i =
∫ 1
0
z(wi(a))11R(wi(a))−δi(a) da, the agent is not
constrained by the pension requirement (19). In this region, the multiplier pii
is zero and the consumption net of the pension transfer P (Zi) is flat, as shown
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on Figure 6. For positive pii, the derivative with respect to Z can be computed
using the envelope theorem. The variables pii and `zi (a) are jointly solutions of
equations (19) and (20). Drawing labor supply from (20), `zi (a) is nondecreasing
in pii. Substituting into (19), pii is nondecreasing in Z. Hence γi(Z;R) is concave
in Z for all i.
To express the Frechet-derivatives with respect to the tax schedule R, dif-
ferentiate γi(Z;R + εh) with respect to ε by the envelope theorem and use the
change of variables w = wi(a) as in the pure tax case (see the proof of (5) in
Appendix A.1).
Zi
γi(Zi;R)
Z0i
γi(0;R)
γi(Zi;R)
Figure 6: Consumption net of pension transfer
4.2 Incentive constraints
By (17), agent i’s lifetime consumption is ci = γi(Zi;R) +Pi. The single-crossing
property for the iso-consumption curves ci(Zi, Pi) is equivalent to ordering the
slopes γ′i(Z;R) with respect to the agent type i.
Assumption 4.1 (Type ordering). The productivities and pecuniary costs are
ordered: for all ages a,
w1(a) ≤ w2(a) ≤ . . . ≤ wI(a) and δ1(a) > δ2(a) > · · · > δI(a).
Lemma 4. Under Assumption 4.1, the single-crossing property holds:
∂γ1(Z;R)
∂Z
≤ ∂γ2(Z;R)
∂Z
≤ . . . ≤ ∂γI−1(Z;R)
∂Z
≤ ∂γI(Z;R)
∂Z
for all Z. It follows that an allocation (Pi, Zi), i = 1, . . . , I, is incentive compatible
if and only if the local incentive constraints (i.e. those corresponding to adjacent
types) are satisfied, together with the monotonicity condition
Z1 ≤ Z2 ≤ . . . ≤ ZN−1 ≤ ZN .
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Proof. We already know that pii = −∂γi(Z;R)/∂Z, together with `i(a), are solu-
tions of the system made of (19) and (20). Moreover an increase in pii raises `i(a)
by (20), and therefore the left-hand side of (19). Now under Assumption 4.1, note
that both wi(a) and `i(a), the latter since by construction R(wi(a)) + piiz(wi(a))
is nondecreasing in wi(a), are nondecreasing in wi(a). Hence the left-hand side
of (19) is also nondecreasing in wi(a). Furthermore, `i(a) and therefore the
left-hand side of (19) decreases with δi(a). It follows that the left-hand side
of (19) increases with the type i. Therefore pii is non-increasing in i under As-
sumption 4.1, which yields the single-crossing property. The second part of the
Lemma is standard.
The pension multipliers pii = −∂γi/∂Z reflect the pressure placed by the pen-
sion system on labor supply behavior. The single-crossing property expresses the
fact that a same pension requirement Z places less pressure on more productive
agents. Figure 7 shows the shape of the functions γi(Z;R) as the agent type i
and the tax schedule R vary. The functions are non-increasing and concave in
Z and their slope γ′i = −pii increases as i and R locally rises. The latter point
follows from the observation that pii decreases with R in all three regimes, see (25)
and (27).
Z
γi+1(Z;R)
γi(Z;R)
Z0i Z
0
i+1
γi+1(0;R)
γi(0;R)
γ(Z;R)
(a) The functions γi(Z;R) are concave and
steeper as i rises, in regimes L, N and W .
Z
γi(Z;R)
γi(Z;R+ dR)
γi(.;R)
(b) The function γi(Z;R) is steeper
than γi(Z;R+ dR), dR > 0.
Figure 7: Shape of γi(Z;R) as the agent type and the tax schedule vary
4.3 Taxonomy of economies
Denoting by λ the multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint and µi+1,i
and µi,i+1 those associated respectively with the downward and upward incentive
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constraints, the Lagrangian of the government problem can be written as
Lz =
I∑
i=1
{
ui(ci) + λ
(∫ 1
0
[wi(a)− δi(a)]`zi (a) da− ci
)}
+
∑
i,j
µi,j {ci − cj + γj(Zj;R)− γi(Zj;R)} ,
where the second sum is taken over adjacent agents i and j.
Holding the tax schedule R(w) and the Zi’s fixed, it is equivalent to differ-
entiate the Lagrangian with respect to consumption levels ci or with respect to
the pension transfers Pi, because ci = Pi + γi(Zi;R). Doing so yields a simple
taxonomy of economies associated with different patterns of binding incentive
constraints. We say that an economy
• is redistributive if u′1(c1) > u′2(c2) > · · · > u′I(cI), or more generally where
the average weight of the agents less productive than any given agent j
exceeds the cost of public funds,
∑j
i=1 u
′
i(ci) > λj;
• is anti-redistributive if u′1(c1) < u′2(c2) < · · · < u′I(cI), or more generally if∑j
i=1 u
′
i(ci) < λj for all j;
• favors middle classes if the social weights of intermediate agents are above
average, while those of low and high types are below average, so that∑j
i=1 u
′
i(ci) is smaller (larger) than λj for small (large) j.
Lemma 5. In (anti-)redistributive economies, all the (upward) downward in-
centive constraints are binding. In middle class societies, upward (downward)
incentive constraints are binding in the low (high) end of the population.
Proof. The government program is well-behaved in the variables (ci)i=1,...,I , with
a concave objective function and linear constraints defining a non-empty set. By
construction, µi+1,i positive means that agent i + 1 is indifferent between her
allocation and that of agent i, while if she strictly prefers her own, µi+1,i is zero.
Setting νi = µi,i+1 − µi+1,i for i = 1, . . . , I − 1 and ν0 = νI = 0, we can write
the first order conditions with respect to the c’s as:
u′i(ci) + νi − νi−1 − λ = 0,
for i = 1, . . . , I. Summing up these equalities yields
∑
u′i(ci) = Iλ, which shows
that λ is positive. Note that given a consumption vector (ci), the above conditions
allow to compute all the multipliers, first λ, then the ν’s. For i = 1, . . . , I, we
have
νi =
i∑
j=1
[
λ− u′j(cj)
]
, (30)
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with λ = (
∑
u′i)/I. Finally the µ’s are given by
µi,i+1 = max(0, νi) µi+1,i = −min(0, νi). (31)
Lemma 5 follows directly.
Hereafter, we restrict attention to redistributive economies. The Lagrangian
takes the form
Lz =
I∑
i=1
{ui(ci) + λ [Yi(Zi;R)− ci]}
+
I−1∑
i=1
µi+1,i {ci+1 − ci + γi(Zi;R)− γi+1(Zi;R)} , (32)
where Yi(Z;R) denotes agent i’s lifetime net output
Yi(Z;R) =
∫ 1
0
[wi(a)− δi(a)]`zi (a) da
and `zi is agent i’s labor supply, given by (20).
4.4 The optimal choice of the pension requirements
We now differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to the pension requirements Zi,
holding lifetime consumptions ci and the tax schedule R(w) fixed. When the
pension constraint (19) is binding, a change in Zi alters the multiplier pii, and in
turn agent i’s labor supply and lifetime net output.
More precisely, an increase in Zi increases pii by dpii > 0 as shown in (26), and
hence increases labor supply. For instance, in regime L, the adjusted after-tax
schedule is shifted upwards, see Figure 8. The requirement to get the pension
transfer Pi is stronger and the agent has to work longer. Assuming that the
pension constraint (19) is binding, we compute in Appendix D the derivative of
agent i’s lifetime net output Yi(`zi ) with respect to the pension requirement Zi as
∂Yi
∂Zi
=
∑
σ∈Si(wσ − δσ)z(wσ)ηi(wσ)∑
σ∈Si z
2(wσ)ηi(wσ)
, (33)
where Si is the set of agent i’s switch points. The term (wσ − δσ)/z(wσ) is a
measure of the local distortion of labor supply around the concerned switch point.
At any efficient allocation, this term is zero at all switch points. Labor supply
is locally distorted downwards (upwards) when this term is positive (negative).
The derivative of an agent lifetime net output thus appears as a weighted average
of adjusted distortions (w − δ)/z over her switch points.
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wR, δ
Agent i’s trajectory
R(w)
R(w) + pii
R(w) + pii + dpii
Figure 8: In regime L, a small increase in Zi raises the adjusted after tax-schedule
R + pii by dpii > 0
Differentiating (32) with respect to Zi, i = 1, . . . , I−1, while keeping ci and R
fixed, we find, in a redistributive economy
λ
∂Yi
∂Zi
= µi+1,i
[
∂γi+1(Zi;R)
∂Z
− ∂γi(Zi;R)
∂Z
]
≥ 0, (34)
where the inequality follows from the ordering assumption 4.1 and Lemma 4. The
derivative is zero for the highest type, i = I.
Proposition 4. At the second-best allocation of a redistributive economy, a
weighted average of adjusted local distortions (wσ − δσ)/zσ over an agent set of
switch points is zero for the highest type and positive for the other types.
When an agent’s trajectory has only one switch point, for instance when it is
decreasing as in section 4.6 below, we conclude that labor supply is undistorted
for the most productive agent and is distorted downwards for the other agents.
4.5 Optimal income tax
As in the pure taxation case, it is useful to analyze the effect of a change in income
tax through the efficiency and redistribution forces. From (32) the Lagrangian is
given by
Lz =
I∑
i=1
{ui(ci) + λ [Yi(`zi )− ci]}
+
I−1∑
i=1
µi+1,i {Pi+1 − Pi + γi+1(Zi+1;R)− γi+1(Zi;R)} . (35)
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We proceed as in Section 3 to break down the derivative of the Lagrangian as
dLz = dΦz+ dΨz, where Φz(w; `zi ) and Ψz(w; `zi ) represent the net social marginal
utility of income and the efficiency force. To this aim, we perturb the tax schedule
respectively in an interval that does not contain any switch point and around a
switch point. We implement these perturbations holding the pension scheme
(Pi, Zi) fixed.
We consider first the redistribution force. The following proposition shows
that the correction for the presence of the incentive constraints increases the
social marginal utility of income relative to the pure taxation case. Thus, as
regards the redistribution motive, the presence of a pension scheme pushes after-
tax income up.
Proposition 5. The incentive constraints attached to pension decisions push up
the redistribution force. Formally, at the second-best optimum with a pension
scheme (Pi, Zi):
dΦz(w; `z) ≥ dΦo(w; `z). (36)
Proof. A perturbation of the tax schedule outside switch points does not only
change the actual consumption levels, ci = Pi + γi(Zi;R), but also the counter-
factual consumption levels the agents would enjoy if they deviated to allocations
designed for other agents, Pj+γi(Zj;R), j 6= i. We obtain the net social marginal
utility of income by differentiating (35) with respect to the tax schedule, keeping
the (Z, P )s constant. Specifically, using the derivatives of the γi’s given by (28)
and (29), we get, in a redistributive economy
dΦz(w; `z) =
I∑
i=1
(u′i − λ) dTi(w; `zi )
+
I−1∑
i=1
µi+1,i
[
dTi+1(w; `
z
i+1)− dTi+1(w; `zi+1(Zi))
]
(37)
for regimes L and W , where `zi+1(Zi) is the optimal labor supply of type i + 1
when she wants to get the pension P (Zi) of type i, given the tax schedule R. The
formula must be corrected by replacing Ti with (1+pii)Ti for all i for the regime N .
The first term of (37) corresponds to the social marginal utility of income (net of
the cost of public funds) that the government would consider if it wrongly ignored
the presence of the incentive constraints, namely dΦo(w; `z). The second term
is nonnegative because Zi+1 ≥ Zi for i < I and hence dTi+1(w; `zi+1(Zi+1)) ≥
dTi+1(w; `
z
i+1(Zi)) for any productivity level w (by Lemma 2 and equation (24)
labor supply increases with Z).
It is worthwhile noticing that the redistribution force in fact involves only
incentives. Indeed, differentiating (32) with respect to the after-tax income R,
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keeping the (Z, c)s rather than (Z, P )s constant, we get an alternative expression
for the redistribution force:
Φz(w; `z) =
I−1∑
i=1
µi+1,i
[
Ti(w; `
z
i (Zi))− Ti+1(w; `zi+1(Zi))
]
. (38)
The equivalence of (37) and (38) is easily checked by replacing u′i(ci) − λ with
µi+1,i−µi,i−1 using (30) and (31). Thus, the introduction of pensions changes the
channel through which the redistribution force operates. Instead of redistributing
directly across agents, the after tax schedule serves as a facilitating device for
redistribution through pension transfers. This new channel actually increases
the redistribution force, dΦz ≥ dΦo. Other things being equal –in particular the
efficiency force being kept fixed– after-tax income should be raised to alleviate
the incentive constraints.
Turning to efficiency, we examine how the presence of the pension scheme
modifies the expression dΨo(w; `o) seen in Section 3. Holding the pension re-
quirements fixed and perturbing the tax schedule at a switch point wσ of agent i,
we first compute the effect on the agent lifetime net output for a given level
of the pension multiplier pii. Using (11) and replacing ηoi with the appropriate
elasticity ηzi , we get
∂Yi
∂R |pii
= [wσ − δσ] ηzi (wσ;R), (39)
where the cost of work at the switch point δσ equals R(wσ)+pizσ under the pension
system Z. (In contrast, δσ = R(wσ) − s in the absence of pension system.) Yet
the perturbation of the tax schedule, at fixed pension requirement Zi, alters the
pension multiplier pii so as to maintain equations (19) and (20).
Proposition 6. The feedback effect due to the endogeneity of pension multipliers
reduces the derivative of net output with respect to after tax income:
∂Yi
∂R
≤ ∂Yi
∂R |pii
. (40)
Proof. The efficiency force reflects the total effect of tax perturbations around
switch points on the net output in the economy:
dΨz(w; `z) = λ
∑
i
∂Yi
∂R
.
The direct effect –at given levels of the pension multipliers– follows from (39).
When the pension constraint (19) is binding, a tax rise around a switch point
increases pii according to (25). In turn, the agent net output Yi is modified as
follows
∂Yi
∂pii
∂pii
∂R
=
(∑
σ∈Si
(wσ − δσ)z(wσ)ηzi (wσ)
)(
− z(w)η
z
i (w)∑
σ∈Si z
2(wσ)ηzi (wσ)
)
.
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The sign of the above term at the second-best optimum is known. Indeed, us-
ing (33) and the optimality condition regarding the pension requirements Zi,
equation (34), we find that the feedback effect of the change in pension multipli-
ers on net output is negative:
∂Yi
∂pii
∂pii
∂R
= −z(w)ηzi (w)
∂Yi
∂Zi
≤ 0.
Thus, the effect of a tax decrease on net outptut is reduced by the presence of
the pension requirements and the associated changes in the endogenous pension
multipliers.
As is transparent in the proof of Proposition 6, raising taxes around a switch
point increases the pressure placed by the pension system on the concerned
agent’s labor supply, thus attenuating the depressive effect of the tax rise on
labor supply. In other words, the presence of the pension system introduces an
implicit income effect. To meet the pension requirements, the agents respond less
vigorously to tax rises, reducing their net output by less than they would do in
the absence of the pension system.
The pension requirements provide the government with new instruments to
control labor supply. The presence of these extra instruments, in turn, makes
it optimal for the government to place more (less) emphasis on redistributive
(efficiency) concerns when setting taxes. In other words, the government can
be bolder in redistributing through taxes as another instrument is available to
mitigate the negative consequences of taxes on labor supply.
4.6 Decreasing trajectories
We now revisit the above general analysis in the two-type example of Section 3.2
where the agent trajectories are decreasing and the single-crossing property holds,
recall Assumption 3.1.
When the trajectories are decreasing, the quantityR(wi(a))+piiz(wi(a))−δi(a)
decreases with age for i = H,L, implying from (20) that the agents work up to
a retirement age a where R(wi(a)) + piiz(wi(a)) − δi(a) = 0 and do not work
afterwards. An allocation is therefore given by a quadruple (aH , aL, cH , cL).
When agent i is constrained by the pension requirement (pii > 0), her retire-
ment age is given by the equality in (19) or∫ ai
0
z(wi(a)) da = Zi.
Under this circumstance, labor supply is determined by the pension system only.
As it does not depend on the after-tax schedule R, the agent does not contribute
to the efficiency force. On the other hand, when pii = 0, the efficiency force takes
the same form as under the pure taxation case studied in Section 3.
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In this section, we first show that the efficiency force is identically zero at the
second best optimum: Ψz(w; `z) = 0 for all w. This property makes it easy to
characterize the second best allocation.
Lemma 6. At the second-best optimum, agent H’s labor supply if she picked
agent L’s pension plan would be unconstrained by the requirement ZL:
∂γH(ZL;R)
∂Z
= 0.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that agent H’s labor supply were constrained
under requirement ZL, i.e. ∂γH(ZL;R)/∂Z < 0. Then by single crossing,
Lemma 4, agent L would a fortiori be constrained under that requirement:
∂γL(ZL;R)/∂Z < ∂γH(ZL;R)/∂Z < 0 or piL > 0. In other words, the pen-
sion requirement (19) would be binding for both agents with Z = ZL, implying
that agent H would retire earlier than L. As furthermore H is everywhere more
productive than L, we find that agent H would spend less time working at low
productivities than agent L. Using the expression (38) of the redistribution force,
we get
Φz(w; `z) = µHL [TL(w, `
z
L(ZL))− TH(w, `zH(ZL))] > 0
for all w in each of the three considered regimes. On the other hand, the efficiency
force in this configuration would be zero because agent H never contributes to
that force (as her labor supply is known to be undistorted at the optimum,
recall Section 4.4) and agent L does not contribute either because piL > 0 by
assumption. The government would thus have an incentive to raise after-tax
income, the desired contradiction.
Lemma 7. The efficiency force is inactive at the second-best optimum: Ψz(w; `z) =
0 for all productivity level w.
Proof. As already mentioned, agent H does not contribute to the efficiency force
at the second-best optimum because her labor supply is undistorted. As regards
agent L, we use the first-order conditions for the pension requirements. We
rewrite (33) as
∂YL
∂ZL
=
wL(aL)− δL(aL)
z(wL(aL))
,
and (34) as
λ
wL(aL)− δL(aL)
z(wL(aL))
= µ
[
∂γH(ZL;R)
∂Z
− ∂γL(ZL;R)
∂Z
]
,
and finally, using Lemma 6,
λ
wL(aL)− δL(aL)
z(wL(aL))
= −µ∂γL(ZL;R)
∂Z
.
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The above equation shows that if agent L’s labor supply is unconstrained by
the pension system (∂γL(ZL;R)/∂Z = 0), then it must be undistorted, implying
that the agent does not contribute to the efficiency force. When piL > 0, aL is
determined by ZL and independent of the tax scheme, as already mentioned.
Proposition 7. Under Assumption 3.1, the following properties hold at a second
best allocation (aH , aL, cH , cL) with the income tax and pension instruments:
(i) After tax income can be taken to be constant;
(ii) Agent H has her labor supply undistorted, aH = a∗H ;
(iii) Agent L labor supply is distorted downwards;
(iv) The rent granted to agent H is reduced to the minimum unobservable dif-
ference in opportunity costs of work:
cH − cL =
∫ aL
0
[δL(a)− δH(a)] da > 0. (41)
Proof. As any constant function is an admissible variation in the government
optimization problem, we get that
< dΦz, 1 >= Φz(∞, `z) = µHL[TL(∞, `zL(ZL))− TH(∞, `zH(ZL))] = 0,
meaning that agent H, if she picked agent L’s pension plan, would retire at
age aL: TH(∞, `zH(ZL)) = TL(∞, `zL(ZL)). The binding incentive constraint can
therefore be rewritten as (see (18) and (16))
cH − cL = γH(ZL;R)− γL(ZL;R)
=
∫ aL
0
[R(wH(a))−R(wL(a)) + δL(a)− δH(a)] da. (42)
The functions R and −R also constitute admissible variations in the government
optimization problem as both (1 + ε)R and (1− ε)R are nondecreasing functions
for 0 < ε < 1. It follows that
< dLz, R >=< dΦz, R > + < dΨz, R >= 0,
and hence, by Lemma 7, < dΦz, R >= 0. Now
< dΦz, R >= µHL
∫
w
R(w)[ dTL(w, `
z
L(ZL))− dTH(w, `zH(ZL))] = 0.
It follows that the terms involving the tax schedule in (42) vanish:∫ aL
0
[R(wH(a))−R(wL(a))] da =< dΦz, R >= 0,
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which yields (41). Using the feasibility condition
cH + cL =
∫ aL
0
[wL(a)− δL(a)] da+
∫ aH
0
[wH(a)− δH(a)] da,
we can solve for lifetime consumption levels
2cH =
∫ aL
0
[wL(a)− δL(a)] da+
∫ aH
0
[wH(a)− δH(a)] da+
∫ aL
0
[δL(a)− δH(a)] da
and
2cL =
∫ aL
0
[wL(a)− δL(a)] da+
∫ aH
0
[wH(a)− δH(a)] da−
∫ aL
0
[δL(a)− δH(a)] da,
and replace them in the government objective u(cH) + u(cL). Differentiating
the objective with respect to aH yields wH(aH) = δH(aH), agent H retires at
the efficient age, which we already know from Section 4.4. Differentiating with
respect to aL yields
[u′(cH) + u′(cL)] [wL(aL)− δL(aL)] = [u′(cL)− u′(cH)] [δL(aL)− δH(aL)] .
The first factor at the right-hand side is positive as cL < cH from (41). The
second factor is positive by Assumption 3.1. It follows that wL(aL) > δL(aL),
agent L retires inefficiently early, point iii of the proposition.
Propositions 5 and 6 materialize in a particularly strong form in the special
circumstances considered here – an economy with two types of agents with de-
creasing trajectories. Indeed here the actual impact of the tax system on labor
supply (the “true” efficiency force) is zero as labor supply is fully controlled by
the pension instruments. It is thus optimal for the government to use taxes to re-
distribute with no consideration for efficiency, hence an extreme form of taxation
in this particular instance, 100% marginal rate.
The exact level of the after-tax income is undetermined because the average
redistribution force Φz(∞, `z) is zero: a vertical translation of the after-tax sched-
ule leaves the Lagrangian unchanged. In fact, while the allocation (aH , aL, cH , cL)
is completely determined, the pension transfers PL and PH , together with the
constant after-tax income R, only satisfy
PH + aHR = cH +
∫ aH
0
δH(a) da
PL + aLR = cL +
∫ aL
0
δL(a) da,
which leaves a degree of freedom when implementing the allocation (R = 0 is a
possible choice).
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Finally, comparing (41) with (15), we see that in an economy with two types of
agents and decreasing trajectories, the pension instrument allows to eliminate all
the rents that a pure tax system would have to concede to the high productivity
types. Also, see Proposition 7, it suppresses all upward labor supply distortions
and reduces downward distortions. Moreover the two instruments fully specialize:
pensions provide the incentives to work, while taxes do all the redistribution.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
A.1 Derivative of lifetime consumption and redistribution
force
We first compute the Frechet-derivative of lifetime consumption levels with re-
spect to the tax schedule R. We consider a perturbation R + εh of the tax
schedule, where h is a nonnegative test function h with compact support. Using
the expression of ci, equation (4), and the change of variables w = wi(a), we find
that the ratio [ci(R + εh)− ci(R)]/ε tends to∫ 1
0
h(wi(a))`i(a) da =
∫
h(w) dTi(w; `i)
as ε goes to zero, meaning that the positive measure dTi(w; `i) is the Frechet-
derivative of ci. This is the formal statement corresponding to equation (5).
Ti(w)/Li is the cumulative distribution function of wi seen as a random variable.
If we think of agent i’s productivity when she works as a random variable and
denote that variable by W˜i, the above integral can be seen as the expectation of
h(W˜i), multiplied by Li.
The chain rule then yields the redistribution force (7). Keeping labor supply
constant, the ratio [L(R + εh)− L(R)]/ε tends to
N∑
i=1
[u′i(ci)− λ]
∫
h(w) dTi(w)
as ε goes to zero, which yields (7).
A.2 Labor supply elasticity and efficiency force
Labor supply is changed under the perturbed scheduleR+εh only if the support of
h contains switching points. For ease of exposition, we assume that the support
contains only one switching point, that we denote by w¯. We denote by i the
switching agent and by ai the age at which agent i switches at w¯. We have:
wi(ai) = w¯ and R(w¯)− s = δi(ai). To fix ideas, we suppose that both δ′(ai) and
w′(ai) are positive and that the slope of the indifferent agent’s trajectory is larger
than the slope of the schedule: δ′i(ai)/w′(ai) > R′(w¯).
The perturbed schedule R + εh crosses agent i’s trajectory at points w such
that there exists a with w = w(a) and Θ(a, ε) = 0, where
Θ(a, ε) = εh(w(a))− δ(a) +R(w(a))− s.
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As ∂Θ/∂ε(ai, 0) = h(w¯) and ∂Θ/∂a(ai, 0) = −δ′i(ai) + R′(w¯)w′i(ai), the ratio
[Ti(w;R + εh)− Ti(w;R)]/ε tends to
h(w¯)
δ′i(ai)−R′(w¯)w′i(ai)
for w > w¯
0 for w ≤ w¯.
as ε goes to zero. If the slope of the tax schedule is larger than that of the
trajectory, δ′i(ai)/w′(ai) < R′(w¯), replacing R with R + εh changes labor supply
on the left of w¯ and the ratio [Ti(w;R + εh)− Ti(w;R)]/ε tends to
h(w¯)
|δ′i(ai)−R′(w¯)w′i(ai)|
for w ≥ w¯
0 for w < w¯.
as ε goes to zero. This yields expression (9) for the elasticity of agent i’s labor
supply. The Frechet-derivative of Ti(w;R) is thus given by
∂Ti(w;R)
∂(R− s) =
∑
σ∈Si(w)
εi(wσ;R)
Ti(wσ;R)
R(wσ)− s ζ(wσ), (43)
where Si(w) is the set of agent i’s switch points σ located below w, wσ ≤ w
is the agent’s productivity at σ, and ζ(wσ) denotes the mass point at wσ. The
Frechet-derivative of the total labor supply T has the same expression as above,
replacing Si(w) with S(w), the set of all agents’ switch points located below w.
We use the same method to compute the Frechet-derivative of the term∫ 1
0
[wi(a) − δi(a)]`i(a) da. The only difference with the above analysis is the
presence of the multiplicative term wi(a) − δi(a), which, at a = ai, is equal
to w¯ −R(w¯) + s, given that w¯ is a switch point. This yields (12) and (13).
Discontinuous Lagrangian Consider an indifference point w such that the
incentive schedule is locally tangent to the indifferent agent’s trajectory. (In
other words, we have: σ = R′.) Then the Lagrangian is discontinuous at w as
an infinitesimally small increase in R implies a non-infinitesimal change in the
Lagrangian. In other words, the efficiency force is particulary strong, creating a
discontinuity in the Lagrangian, whose sign is the same as that of w−R+s. This
is in particular the case where the tax schedule locally coincides with an agent
trajectory.
B From increasing to piecewise constant sched-
ules
Lemma B.1. Let R be any nondecreasing tax schedule. Let w < w¯ be such that
none of the agents’ trajectories (wi(a), δi(a)), a ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, . . . , I, intersects
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the rectangle [w, w¯] × [R(w), R(w¯)]. Assume that the functions Ti have at most
finitely many discontinuity points.
Then there exists a nondecreasing tax schedule R¯, such that R¯ is piecewise
constant, with finitely many pieces, on [w, w¯], R¯ takes its values in [R(w), R(w¯)]
on this interval, and ∫ w¯
w
R¯(w) dTi(w) =
∫ w¯
w
R(w) dTi(w)
for i = 1, . . . , I. If all the functions Ti are continuous on [w, w¯], then the schedule
R¯ has at most I + 1 pieces on [w, w¯].
Proof: By assumption, labor supply is not affected as long as the schedule
remains between R(w) and R(w¯). We can therefore drop the second argument
in the functions Ti, writing Ti(w) rather than Ti(w,R). Let w1, . . . , wN be the
discontinuity points of the functions Ti. Let w0 = w and wN+1 = w¯. We have:∫ w¯
w
R(w) dTi(w) =
∑
j
∫ wj+1
wj
R(w) dTi(w) +R(wj)[Ti(w
+
j )− Ti(w−j )].
It is sufficient to prove the result on each interval [wj, wj+1]. Integrating by parts
yields:∫ wj+1
wj
R(w) dTi(w) = [Ti(w
−
j+1)−Ti(w+j )]R(wj+1)−
∫ wj+1
wj
[Ti(w)−Ti(w+j )] dR(w).
We now apply Lemma A.1 (p. 1260) of Ghosal and Van der Vaart (2001) with the
compact set K = [wj, wj+1], the probability measure F0 = dR(w)/[R(wj+1) −
R(wj)] and the functions Ψi(w) = Ti(w) − Ti(w+j ), i = 1, . . . , I, which are con-
tinuous on K. The Lemma yields a discrete probability measure ν on K with at
most I + 1 support points such that
1
[R(wj+1)−R(wj)]
∫ wj+1
wj
[Ti(w)−Ti(w+j )] dR(w) =
∫ wj+1
wj
[Ti(w)−Ti(w+j )] dν(w)
for all i = 1, . . . , I. Integrating again by parts yields∫ wj+1
wj
R(w) dTi(w) = [Ti(w
−
j+1)− Ti(w+j )]R(wj+1)
−[R(wj+1)−R(wj)]
∫ wj+1
wj
[Ti(w)− Ti(w+j )] dν(w)
= [Ti(w
−
j+1)− Ti(w+j )]R(wj+1)
−[R(wj+1)−R(wj)][Ti(w−j+1)− Ti(w+j )]
+[R(wj+1)−R(wj)]
∫ wj+1
wj
ν(w) dTi(w)
=
∫ wj+1
wj
R¯(w) dTi(w)
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with R¯(w) = R(wj) + [R(wj+1) − R(wj)]ν(w). The schedule R¯ is nondecreas-
ing and piecewise constant, with at most I + 1 pieces. It takes its values in
[R(wj), R(wj+1)]. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider an interval where the schedule is increasing.
The schedule can locally coincide with an increasing trajectory, in which case
efficiency and redistribution play in opposite directions: the schedule is slightly
below the trajectory if dΦo > 0 and w < R−s, slightly above if dΦo < 0 and w >
R−s. For instance, in the former case, lowering (raising) R entails an infinitesimal
(a non-infinitesimal) fall in the Lagrangian through the redistribution (efficiency)
effect.7
Now consider an interval [w,w′] where the schedule is increasing and does
not coincide with an increasing trajectory.8 By compactness of [w,w′], there
exists a finite sequence w = w1 < · · · < wh = w′ such that no trajectory crosses
the rectangles [wj, wj+1]× [R(wj), R(wj+1)]. On each interval [wj, wj+1], we apply
Lemma B.1 and replace R with a piecewise constant schedule that takes its values
in [R(wj), R(wj+1)] and leaves the government revenue and the agents’ lifetime
consumption and labor supply unchanged.
C Decreasing trajectories
In this section, we examine case (b) and case (c) in the proof of Proposition 3.
In case (b), we have δH(aH) = R(wH(aH))−s ≥ R(wL(aL))−s = δL(aL). We
deal separately with the situation where the two agents have the same opportunity
costs when they stop working, and when that of H is larger than that of L.
Suppose first that δL(aL) = δH(aH). Then the financial incentive to work R(w)−s
is equal to that common opportunity cost for all w ≥ wL(aL). The efficiency
force wL(aL)− δL(aL) cannot be downwards at wL(aL) as this would violate the
first-order condition on the bunching interval starting at wL(aL) (in practice,
the government would slightly decrease the after tax income at wL(aL)), hence
wH(aH) > wL(aL) ≥ δL(aL) = δH(aH): agent H’s labor supply is distorted
downwards.
Suppose now that δL(aL) < δH(aH). Since u′(cL) > u′(cH) and only agent L
works at productivities lying between wL(aL) and wH(aH), the redistribution
force pushes upwards and the financial incentive to work R− s equals δH(aH) in
that interval. The tax schedule, therefore, is discontinuous at wL(aL) and equal to
δH(aH) above that point. Consider the perturbation that moves the discontinuity
point wL(aL) in the tax schedule slightly to the left while maintaining R − s =
7In other words, the Lagrangian is locally discontinuous in productivity regions where the
tax schedule is locally tangent to a trajectory, see Appendix A.2.
8The first-order conditions imply that the net social marginal utility of income, dΦo, is
identically zero on [w,w′] and that R(w)− s = w at any switch point in this region.
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Figure 9: Decreasing trajectories: Case (b) (top) and (3) (bottom) of Proposi-
tion 3
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δH(aH). This perturbation, which does not affect agent H, increases agent L’s
labor supply and consumption. Consumption is increased by a first-order quantity
because the agent receives positive extra income δH(aH) − δL(aL) > 0 during a
small time interval, hence a positive redistributive effect. The efficiency part of
the perturbation is a change in the Lagrangian of the sign of wL(aL) − δ(aL).
Expressing that the latter must outweigh the former, the first-order condition on
R in the bunching interval, yields wL(aL) < δ(aL), an upward distortion in L’s
labor supply.
Finally we consider case (c), denoting by w the common value of wH(aH)
and wL(aL). We first show that the tax schedule necessarily intersects the two
trajectories at the same point: δH(aH) and δL(aL) must be equal. Suppose for in-
stance that δH(aH) < δL(aL). A small increase dRH in after-tax income below w
would put agent H to work on a small time interval of length dTH = ηoH dRH .
Similarly a small decrease − dRL in after-tax income above w would put agent L
out of work on a small time interval of length dTL = ηoL dRL. These transfor-
mations have redistribution effects that are of the second order. Choosing dRH
and dRL such that dTH = dTL, we find by (12) that the associated changes in
the Lagrangian would be respectively λ(w − δH(a)) dT and −λ(w − δL(a)) dT .
The sum of these two quantities would be of the sign of δL(a)− δH(a), therefore
positive, implying that one of the above changes would increase the Lagrangian
through the efficiency force –a contradiction. A similar contradiction is found if
δH(aH) > δL(aL), hence the announced equality.
The tax schedule is flat above w. A slight decrease of its constant level has a
positive redistribution effect, and must therefore have a negative efficiency effect,
implying that both agents have their labor supply distorted downwards.
D Labor supply elasticity under a pension scheme
The multiplier pii(Z;R) is defined jointly by (19) and (20), which can be rewritten
as K(pii) = Z with
K(pii) =
∫ 1
0
z(wi(a))11R(wi(a))+piiz(wi(a))−δi(a)≥0 da.
We obtain the derivative of K with respect to pii by the same method as in
Appendix A.2, using the function Θ(a, pii) = R(wi(a)) + piiz(wi(a))− δi(a):
∂K
∂pii
=
∑
σ∈Si
z2(wσ)η
z
i (wσ;R, pii).
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The inverse function theorem yields (26). Similarly the Frechet-derivative of K
with respect to R is given by
∂K
∂R
=
∑
σ∈Si
z(wσ)η
z
i (wσ;R, pii)ζ(wσ)
in regime L and W and
∂K
∂R
= dTi(w; `
z
i ) +
∑
σ∈Si
R(wσ)η
z
i (wσ;R, pii)ζ(wσ)
in regime N , where ζ(wσ) denotes the mass point at wσ. Applying the implicit
function theorem yields the Frechet-derivative of pii with respect to R:
∂pii
∂R
= −
∑
σ∈Si z(wσ)η
z
i (wσ;R, pii)ζ(wσ)∑
σ∈Si z
2(wσ)ηzi (wσ;R, pii)
(44)
in regime L and W , and by
∂pii
∂R
= − dTi(w; `
z
i ) +
∑
σ∈Si R(wσ)η
z
i (wσ;R, pii)ζ(wσ)∑
σ∈Si R
2(wσ)ηzi (wσ;R, pii)
(45)
in regime N . In this last regime, increasing R outside a switch points increases
the after-tax income collected during the lifetime, modifies (19), hence the new
term Ti at the numerator in the expression of pii. Equations (44) and (45) are
the formal counterparts of (25) and (27).
Finally, to compute the derivative of an agent’s net output Yi with respect to
the pension requirement Zi, we use the chain rule
∂Yi
∂Zi
=
∂Yi
∂pii
∂pii
∂Zi
,
where the second term, ∂pii/∂Zi, is given by (26). Computing the first term,
∂Yi/∂pii with the same method as above yields (33).
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